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I. INTRODUCTION
September 11,2001 stands as a headstone in the field of history. On that day,
suicide terrorists hijacked four civilian airliners and crashed two of them into the
World Trade Center towers, one into the Pentagon, and one into the ground in
Pennsylvania.
Congress rapidly reacted to the attacks by passing a series of laws affecting
law enforcement,2 alien immigration,' and the President's use of military force.4
This Comment focuses upon one of those laws passed by Congress, the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF),5 and its effect upon the
constitutional rights of persons classified as terrorists.
On September 12, 2001, Congress directly referred to a war against
terrorism, stating that Congress:
thanks those foreign leaders and individuals who have expressed
solidarity with the United States in the aftermath of the attacks, and asks
them to continue to stand with the United States in the war against
international terrorism. . . [and] . . . commits to support increased
resources in the war to eradicate terrorism.6
The use of the phrases "war against international terrorism" and "war to
eradicate terrorism" suggest that the United States is in a state of war. But is the
use of the phrase "war against terrorism" merely political rhetoric, or does a state
of war actually exist? If the United States is fighting a war to eradicate terrorism,
does the state of war affect the rights of terrorists once classified as criminals?
This comment seeks to answer these questions by comparing the historical use of
I. See Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001, at www.faa.gov/septl lportraits/
chronology.cfm (last visited Oct. 6, 2002) [hereinafter FAA Report] (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (describing the events of September 11, 2001).
2. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) of 2001, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-216 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002).
3. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002).
4. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
5. Id.
6. Act of September 18, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-39, 115 Stat. 222 (2001).
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war powers with the congressional and presidential action taken in response to
the September 11 th terrorist attacks.
Part II of this article describes the September 1 1th terrorist attacks and
presents evidence proving that the Al Qaeda7 terrorist network and Usama Bin
Laden' were the culprits responsible for the destruction.
Part III evaluates the constitutional rights of terrorists prior to September 11,
2001, concluding that prior to September 11, 2001, Congress classified terrorists
as criminals. 9 These criminal terrorists were entitled to the same constitutional
rights and protections as ordinary criminal defendants.°
Part IV analyzes the language Congress uses in the AUMF. The AUMF
initiates a war against five specific categories of enemies." An entity found to be
within one or more of these five categories will be referred to as an Enemy
Terrorists. The AUMF grants the President, as Commander in Chief, the power
to use necessary and appropriate military force to destroy entities determined to
be Enemy Terrorists.12
However, the President's power as Commander in Chief is not unrestricted.
Congress limits the President's use of military force to killing only those Enemy
Terrorists identified by Congress within the AUMF. 3 Part V argues that the
President acts constitutionally as long as he only uses military force against those
enemies defined within the AUMF.
14
Captured Enemy Terrorists pose a different problem. Congress does not
expressly authorize military jurisdiction over captured Enemy Terrorists found in
violation of the law of war. 5 However, the AUMF initiates a state of war against
Enemy Terrorists. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 6 confers upon
the military concurrent jurisdiction over enemy combatants found in violation of
the law of war.' 7 Because the AUMF defines specifically what entities are
7. Author's Note: Al Qaeda can also be spelled "al Qaeda," "Al Qaida," "al Qaida," "Al-Qaeda," and
"Qaeda."
8. Author's Note: Usama Bin Laden has numerous English spellings of his name including: Osama bin
Laden, Osama bin Ladin, Sheik Usama bin Laden, Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Laden.
9. See infra Part Ill (describing how Congress defines terrorist acts as violating federal criminal
statutes).
10. See infra Part III (discussing the criminal prosecution of Timothy McVeigh in federal court.
McVeigh was a terrorist who was entitled to all constitutional rights).
11. See infra Part IV.B.2 (arguing that the AUMF initiates a limited war without a formal declaration of
war); see also infra Part IV.C.2 (describing how the President is authorized by Congress to use military force
against five specific categories of entities).
12. Infra Part IV.B.2 and Part IV.C.2.
13. Infra Part IV.B.2 and Part IV.C.2.
14. See infra Part V.A (proposing that the President's power as Commander in Chief is limited to
compliance with the guidelines set forth within the AUMF).
15. See infra Part V.B (discussing how the AUMF does not expressly mention the term "enemy" or the
term "war").
16. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-946.146 (West 1998 & Supp. 2002).
17. Id.
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enemies at war with the United States, 8 the UCMJ acts together with the AUMF
to grant the military concurrent jurisdiction over captured unlawful Enemy
Terrorist combatants. 9
Military courts apply the common law of war rather than civil law when
prosecuting unlawful enemy combatants. 2° The common law of war does not
offer the accused within the military courts the same constitutional protections
afforded to criminal defendants prosecuted within the civil courts. 2' Therefore,
captured unlawful Enemy Terrorist combatants may be denied constitutional
rights, and the U.S. Supreme Court, based on case precedent, may support this
proposition."
The United States Constitution mandates that the President comply with and
execute the laws prescribed by Congress. 3 The President cannot act
independently from Congress to expand the scope of military action that
Congress has expressly limited.24 Therefore, the President acts constitutionally so
long as he only uses military force, and military justice, against those specific
25
enemies (Enemy Terrorists) defined by Congress within the AUMF.
Part VI concludes that the AUMF shifts the status of Enemy Terrorists from
potential criminals to that of enemies at war. Enemies at war are not entitled to
the protections of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the United States
Constitution." Therefore, persons determined to be unlawful Enemy Terrorist
combatants may be denied certain constitutional rights guaranteed to ordinary
criminal defendants. 27
II. BACKGROUND
A. September 11, 2001
On September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked the United States of America.
American Airlines Flight 11 departed Boston for Los Angeles at 8:00 a.m.
(Eastern Standard Time). 28 The airplane was hijacked by terrorists armed with
18. Infra Part IV.C.2.
19. lnfra Part V.B.1.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. lnfra Part V.B.
23. Infra Part V.A. 1.
24. Id.
25. Infra Part V.B.
26. Infra Part VI.
27. Infra Part VI.
28. FAA Report, supra note I (noting that "[a]ll times are Eastern Daylight" and that "[fllight departures
are actual takeoff times, not scheduled or gate departure times."); see John Ashcroft, Remarks of Attorney
General John Ashcroft on September 11, 2001 (Sept. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Ashcroft Remarks], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/agcrisisremarks.htm (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the
terrorist hijackings).
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knives.29 In a suicide attack, these terrorists crashed the plane into the North
Tower of New York City's World Trade Center at approximately 8:45 a.m.30
United Airlines Flight 175, which departed Boston for Los Angeles at 8:14 a.m.,
was hijacked and crashed into the World Trade Center's South Tower at
approximately 9:02 a.m.3 American Airlines Flight 77 departed Washington,
D.C. for Los Angeles at 8:21 a.m.32 It was hijacked and the terrorists crashed the
plane into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. at approximately 9:40 a.m.33 United
Airlines Flight 93, which departed Newark for San Francisco at 8:41 a.m., was
hijacked and, although the intended target was the White House in Washington,
D.C., the plane crashed in Stony Creek Township, Pennsylvania at 10:07 a.m.
4
The World Trade Center's South Tower collapsed at 10:05 a.m.35 The World
Trade Center's North Tower followed, collapsing at 10:28 a.m.36 At the
Pentagon, 189 people were confirmed dead.37 At the World Trade Center, 2,829
people were confirmed dead." A few passengers apparently overpowered the
terrorists on Flight 93, but the plane crashed, killing all those on board. 9 The
September I Ith terrorists killed more than three thousand people.4 Attorney
29. Ashcroft Remarks, supra note 28.
30. FAA Report, supra note 1; Ashcroft Remarks, supra note 28; Indictment at 4, United States v.
Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A, (E.D. Va. Dec. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Moussaoui Indictment] (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (stating that "co-conspirators Mohammed Atta, Abdul Alomari, Wail al-Shehri,
Waleed al-Shehri, and Satam al-Suqami hijacked American Airlines Flight 11, bound from Boston to Los
Angeles, and crashed it into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York.").
31. FAA Report, supra note 1; see Moussaoui Indictment, supra note 30, at 4 (stating that "co-
conspirators Marwan al-Shehhi, Fayez Ahmed, a/k/a 'Banihammad Fayez,' Ahmed al-Ghamdi, Hamza al-
Ghamdi, and Mohald al-Shehri hijacked United Airlines Flight 175, bound from Boston to Los Angeles, and
crashed it into the South Tower of the World Trade Center in New York.").
32. FAA Report, supra note 1.
33. Id.; see Moussaoui Indictment, supra note 30, at 4 (stating that "co-conspirators Khalid al-Midhar,
Nawaf al-Hazmi, Hani Hanjour, Salem al-Hamzi, and Majed Moqed hijacked American Airlines Flight 77,
bound from Virginia to Los Angeles, and crashed it into the Pentagon.").
34. FAA Report, supra note 1; see Moussaoui Indictment, supra note 30, at 4 (stating that "co-
conspirators Ziad Jarrah, Ahmed al-Haznawi, Saaed al-Ghamdi, and Ahmed al-Nami hijacked United Airlines
Flight 93, bound from Newark to San Francisco, and crashed it in Pennsylvania.").
35. September 11: Chronology of Terror, CNN.com, Sept. 12, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/
us/09/ll/chronology.attack/index.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
36. Id.
37. U.S. State Department, September 11 One Year Later, at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/
0902/ijge/gjchron.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2002) [hereinafter One Year Later] (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (noting that this total included those sixty-four passengers on board American Airlines Flight 77).
38. See id. (stating that this total includes "airline passengers from [American Airlines Flight] 11 and
[United Airlines Flight] 175, and [four hundred fifty-three] public safety workers who responded to the
emergency. The dead came from more than [ninety] countries around the world. Bodily remains of fewer than
half the victims have been identified.").
39. See id. (reporting that forty-four passengers were on board Flight 93).
40. See id. (noting that this estimate includes those nineteen hijackers on board the civilian aircrafts).
2002 / The Criminal-Enemy Distinction
General John Ashcroft described the terrorist attacks as "one of the greatest
tragedies ever witnessed on American soil."
41
1. Al Qaeda
The United States government quickly determined that Al Qaeda was
responsible for the September 1 lth terrorist attacks. President George W. Bush
identified those responsible for the attacks by stating:
[t]he evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely
affiliated terrorist organizations known as Al Qaeda.... This group and
its leader, a person named Osama bin Laden, are linked to many other
organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad
and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these
terrorists in more than [sixty] countries. They are recruited from their
own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like
Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent
back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot
evil and destruction.42
Al Qaeda is a transnational network of regional terrorist organizations
devoted to using terrorism to combat non-Islamic governments. 4 Al Qaeda,
which means "the Base," was founded by Usama Bin Laden and Muhammad
Atef in 1989.44 In 2001, Al Qaeda was headquartered in Afghanistan, Sudan, and
Pakistan. 45 Al Qaeda operates both independently and with other terrorist
organizations. 46 AI Qaeda has trained terrorists at the Jihad University and other
terrorist training camps. 47 All nineteen perpetrators of the September 11 th
terrorist attacks were trained Al Qaeda agents. 4
41. Ashcroft Remarks supra note 28.
42. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (Sept.
20, 2001) [hereinafter Address to a Joint Session].
43. See Moussaoui Indictment, supra note 30, at I (stating that Al Qaeda is "an international terrorist
group ... dedicated to opposing non-islamic governments with force and violence.").
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1-2.
46. Id. at 2-3 (listing those countries known by the United States government to house terrorist
organizations linked with Al Qaeda, "including: the Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea,
Djibouti, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Philippines,
Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, the Kashmiri region of India, and the Chechnyan region of Russia. Al Qaeda also
maintained cells and personnel in a number of countries to facilitate its activities, including in Kenya, Tanzania,
the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Malaysia, and the United States").
47. Id.
48. Id. at 4-5 (naming nineteen Al Qaeda members and specifying their activities leading up to the
attacks).
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2. Usama Bin Laden
Usama Bin Laden, the mastermind behind the September l1th terrorist
attacks, is the youngest son of a wealthy Saudi Arabian businessman: 49 Bin Laden
inherited a fortune from his father and used it to recruit Muslim terrorists to fight
a guerilla war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1970s.5° Usama Bin
Laden returned to Saudi Arabia in 1989, but he was expelled by the government
because he continued to support terrorism.5 Bin Laden then went to Sudan,
where he continued to support terrorist movements.52 After a failed assassination
attempt on Egyptian President Muberak, Sudan expelled Bin Laden in 1996."3
Bin Laden then returned to Afghanistan where he began plotting terrorist
operations against U.S. targets. 54
Following the September 11 th attacks, President Bush ordered the military to
invade Afghanistan to destroy Al Qaeda and the Taliban forces who support
Usama Bin Laden.55 A videotape was recovered showing Usama Bin Laden
describing the planning and execution of the September 1 1th attacks. Bin Laden
stated:
[W]e calculated in advance the number of casualties from the enemy,
who would be killed based on the position of the tower. We calculated
that the floors that would be hit would be three or four floors. I was the
most optimistic of them all. (... Inaudible... ) due to my experience in
this field, I was thinking that the fire from the gas in the plane would
melt the iron structure of the building and collapse the area where the
plane hit and all the floors above it only. This is all that we had hoped
for ... We were at (... inaudible... ) when the event took place. We had
notification since the previous Thursday that the event would take place
that day. We had finished our work that day and had the radio on. It was
5:30 p.m. our time. I was sitting with Dr. Ahmad Abu-al-((Khair)).
Immediately, we heard the news that a plane had hit the World Trade
Center. We turned the radio station to the news from Washington. The
news continued and no mention of the attack until the end. At the end of
49. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, FACT SHEET: USAMA BIN LADIN (Aug. 21, 1998) [hereinafter FACT
SHEET], at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/ africa/fs bin ladin.html (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); Hunting Bin Laden: A Biography of Osama Bin Laden, PBS Frontline, Sept. 13, 2001, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/bio.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2002) (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
50. FACT SHEET, supra note 49..
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training Camps and Taliban Military
Installations in Afghanistan, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1432 (Oct. 7, 2001).
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the newscast, they reported that a plane just hit the World Trade
Center.
56
The videotape strongly suggests that Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda were
responsible for the September 11 th terrorist attacks.
III. THE LAW AS IT WAS
Before September 11, 2001, a terrorist was a criminal." Specifically, a
terrorist was a person engaged in terrorist activities." Congress, acting within its
power to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts, defined acts of terrorism
in federal criminal statutes.59
Persons who committed the most heinous terrorists acts were entitled to the
full bundle of constitutional protections afforded to criminal suspects and
defendants. These rights included: a showing of probable cause required for
search and seizure, an indictment by a grand jury, a trial by jury, a public trial, a
right to counsel, a right to confront witnesses, a right to subpoena witnesses, and
a requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.6°
The Oklahoma City bombing was the worst terrorist incident in the United
States prior to the September 11 th attacks. A twenty-nine-year-old U.S. citizen
and U.S. Army veteran of the Persian Gulf War, Timothy James McVeigh,
61
executed the Oklahoma terrorist attack. On Wednesday morning, April 19,
1995, at 9:02 a.m., McVeigh detonated a truck bomb, devastating the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City.62 The gravity of the
destruction was enormous; of the one hundred sixty-nine identified fatalities,
nineteen were children.63
56. See Transcript of Usama Bin Laden Videotape (George Michael et al., trans.) (Dec. 13, 2001)
[hereinafter Bin Laden Videotape Transcript] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that the
"transcripts and annotations [were] independently prepared by George Michael, translator, Diplomatic
Language Services; and Dr. Kassem M. Wahba, Arabic language program coordinator, School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University."). "They collaborated on their translation and compared it with
translations done by the U.S. government for consistency. There were no inconsistencies in the translations." Id.
57. U.S. State Department, Background Information on Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Definition of
Terrorist Activity Used in These Designations, Oct. 8, 1999, at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/ rpt/fto/2801 .htm
(copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
58. Id.
59. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2002) (defining international terrorism); § 2332b(a)
(defining prohibited acts).
60. U.S. CONST. amend IV, V, VI.
61. Tony Clark, The Worst Terrorist Attack on U.S. Soil: April 19, 1995, Oklahoma CNN (Dec. 30,
1995), at http:/Iwww.cnn.com/us/okc/daily//9512/12-30/index.html (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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McVeigh was a terrorist who was entitled to all of the rights granted to a
criminal defendant. 64 After state and federal authorities detained McVeigh, a
grand jury issued an indictment against McVeigh in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on August 10, 1995.65 Federal
authorities charged McVeigh with eleven counts which included: conspiracy to
use a weapon of mass destruction, use of such a weapon, destruction of federal
property by explosives, and first-degree murder for the deaths of eight federal
law enforcement agents who were killed in the Murrah building. McVeigh was
convicted in federal court of all eleven counts before a jury of his peers on June
67 62, 1997. McVeigh received a death sentence and was then executed.68
The criminal justice system was adequately equipped to administer justice to
Timothy McVeigh. However, the Oklahoma City bombing occurred prior to
September 11, 2001, and the United States was not yet engaged in a war against
terrorists.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
A. Authorization for Use of Military Force
The September 1 1th terrorist attacks "were by far the deadliest terrorist
attacks ever launched against the United States." 69 Thousands of Americans were
killed, and as a result, the perception of terrorism in America dramatically
changed. U.S. policy and law would subsequently evolve to reflect this new
perception.
President Bush symbolized the evolution in U.S. terrorism policy and law,
proclaiming that Al Qaeda "committed an act of war against our country."70 On
September 14, 2001, Congress responded to the September 11 th terrorist attacks
by codifying a new legal distinction between the terrorist criminals of the past
and the terrorist enemies of the present by passing the Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF).71
64. See id. (describing McVeigh as a terrorist).
65. See United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (describing the indictment and
the charges against McVeigh).
66. Id.
67. Jim Lehrer, Online NewsHour: Guilty On All Counts, June 2, 1997, at http://www.pbs.org/news
hour/bb/law/june97/mcveigh_6-2.html (last visited May 14, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
68. Id.
69. Ashcroft Remarks, supra note 28.
70. Address to a Joint Session, supra note 42.
71. See Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(stating that on September 14, 2001, Senator Thomas A. Daschle introduced the AUMF into the U.S. Senate).
After skipping all committees, the AUMF passed the Senate by a unanimous vote and the House, with only one
nay vote, on that same day. The AUMF was presented and then signed into law by President Bush on
September 20, 2001. id.
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B. Initiating a War Against Terrorism
The U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[w]ar has been well defined to be,
'[t]hat state in which a nation prosecutes its right by force."' 72 The AUMF
authorizes a state in which the President can use military force to destroy a
delineated class of entities. But Congress does not formally declare that a state of
war exists.73 Can Congress initiate a war against terrorism, pursuant to their
constitutional war powers, without passing a formal declaration of war?
The AUMF reads in full:
Joint Resolution
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks
launched against the United States.
Whereas, on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were committed against the United
States and its citizens; and
Whereas, such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights
to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad; and
Whereas, in light of the threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed
by these grave acts of violence; and
Whereas, such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and
foreign policy of the United States; and
Whereas, the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts
of international terrorism against the United States: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for Use of Military Force".
SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.
(a) In General-That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations
or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.
(b) War Powers Resolution Requirements-
(1) Specific statutory authorization-Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers
Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.
(2) Applicability of other requirements-Nothing in this resolution supercedes any
requirement of the War Powers Resolution.
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate.
72. The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 666 (1867).
73. See Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(presenting the text of the AUMF, which does not formally declare war); see also infra note 86 (describing the
formal declaration of war against terrorism that was rejected by Congress).
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1. Historical Power to Initiate a Limited War
The Constitution of the United States establishes a fluid structure that
has evolved into our current system of war powers.74 The President is the
Commander in Chief and has power to use military force to defend the Nation
from military attack.75 However, Congress possesses the primary power to initiate
and regulate an offensive war because it can "declare War, grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water; '' 16 "provide for the common Defence;" 77 "define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of
Nations; " "raise and support Armies," "provide and maintain a Navy;" 79 "make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;"8 and
"make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."8
Therefore, Congress, not the President, has the constitutional power to initiate
and regulate the use of military force in all wars, including a war against
terrorism.
Congress can initiate a war that is either perfect or imperfect in kind." A
perfect war is defined as any contention by force, between two nations, that is
"declared in form." 83 The war against Japan in World War II is a clear example
of Congress's power to declare war. Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on
December 7, 1941.84 Congress immediately responded by passing legislation that
proclaimed, "a state of war... is hereby formally declared."8 This language
demonstrated congressional intent to initiate a perfect war.
74. See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by other Means: The Original Understanding of War
Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 177 (1996) (stating that the United States Constitution grants the war power to
both the executive and legislative branches).
75. Id.
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
77. Id. art. I,§8, cl. 1.
78. Id. art. I, § 8, c1. 10.
79. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, 13.
80. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
81. id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
82. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 40 (1800).
83. See id. (stating:
every contention by force between two nations, in external matters, under the authority of their
respective governments, is not only war, but public war. If it be declared in form, it is called
solemn, and is of the perfect kind; because one whole nation is at war with another whole
nation; and all the members of the nation declaring war, are authori[z]ed to commit hostilities
against all the members of the other, in every place, and under every circumstance.)
84. National Park Service, Remembering Pearl Harbor, at http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/twhp/wwwlps/
lessons/18arizona/18chartsl.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Remembering Pearl Harbor] (copy on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
85. Declaration of War Against Japan, Pub. L. No. 77-328, 55 Stat. 795 (Dec. 8, 1941). The joint
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Congress rejected the Formal Declaration of War Against Terrorism on
September 13, 2001, and adopted the AUMF instead." Congress should not pass
a formal declaration of war against terrorism because a perfect war requires two
adverse nations.87 Al Qaeda, the entity responsible for the September 1 1th
attacks, is not a nation or government, but rather, it is an international network of
terrorist organizations. As President Bush stated, "[t]his is a different war from
any our nation has ever faced, a war on many fronts, against terrorists who
operate in more than sixty different countries." 9 Congress should therefore not
pass a formal declaration of war to initiate the use of military force to destroy Al
Qaeda terrorists because there are too many nations involved.
A formal declaration of war is not required to initiate an imperfect or limited
war. 9° In the eighteenth century,, a declared war was merely "the ultimate state in
a gradually ascending scale of hostilities between nations."'" According to
William Blackstone, "a declaration of war only perfected, or made 'completely
effectual,' hostilities between two nations, which otherwise could take any form
resolution declaring that a state of war against Japan reads:
Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts of war against the
Government and the people of the United States of America; Therefore be it Resolved by the
Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan which
has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is
hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United
States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial Government of
Japan; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country
are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.
86. Formal Declaration of War Against Terrorism, H.J. Res. 62, 107th Cong. (Sept. 13, 2001), states in
part:
Pursuant to Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution, the Congress hereby declares that a
state of war exists between the United States and-
(I) any entity that committed the acts on international terrorism against the United States on
September 11, 2001, or commits acts of international terrorism against the United States
thereafter; and
(2) any country or entity that has provided or provides support or protection for any entity
described in paragraph (1).
The President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the
United States and the resources of the United States Government to carry on war against such
entities and countries, and the Congress hereby pledges all the resources of the United States
Government in order to bring the conflict to a successful termination.
87. See Bas, 4 U.S. at 40 (describing how "a perfect war requires two whole nations in armed conflict
with each other.").
88. Supra Part II.A.1.
89. Id.
90. See generally Yoo, supra note 74, at 177 (describing the numerous wars the United States has
engaged in without passing a formal declaration of war).
91. See id. (describing the differences between limited conflict and perfect war).
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that constitutes an 'incomplete state of hostilities.' ' A formal declaration of war
served only to distinguish between limited hostilities and an ultimate conflict. 93
The Constitution as an heir to these English concepts of war, "does not
prescribe one exclusive method for going to war." 4 Of the many species of war,
Congress' ability to initiate a limited war, without passing a formal declaration, is
deeply rooted in the American system of warfare. 95
Congress initiated a limited war in 1799, when it passed four different acts
authorizing the limited use of military force against France.96 The plaintiff in
error in Bas v. Tingy argued before the United States Supreme Court that a state
of war did not and could not exist because no act or law formally declared a state
of war between the United States and France. 97 The Court ruled that the
legislation, though not a formal declaration of war, was sufficient "in law" to
authorize "a limited, partial, war."9' Justice Chase stated that "Congress has not
declared war in general terms; but Congress has authorized hostilities on the high
seas by certain persons in certain cases." 99 In a separate case, Chief Justice John
Marshall, reviewing the same four statutes, stated clearly that Congress may
declare general war, or a partial war.100
A limited war is not confined to two adverse nations engaged in a military
conflict.' °' During the U.S. Civil War, the Supreme Court stated that "It]he
parties belligerent in a public war are independent nations. But it is not necessary
to constitute war, that both parties should be acknowledged as independent nations or
sovereign States."' 2 Congress can therefore initiate a limited war against "places,
persons, and things" without passing a formal declaration of war. °3
92. Id. at 205.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 173-74.
95. See Bas, 4 U.S. at 43 (stating:
[c]ongress is empowered to declare a general war, or congress may wage a limited war; limited
in place, in objects, and in time. If a general war is declared, its extent and operations are only
restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a part of the law of nations; but if a partial war
is waged, its extent and operation depend on our municipal laws.)
96. See id. at 43-44 (describing the progression of the four acts as first authorizing U.S. vessels to resist
search by French vessels, then to capture vessels using force to search, to recapture American vessels seized by
French, and then finally to capture any vessel found on the high seas).
97. Id. Bas was a salvage case. Two statutes conflicted over the amount of salvage awarded. One statute
awarded one-eighth salvage from ships recaptured from the French. The second statute awarded one-half
salvage from ships recaptured from the "enemy." The plaintiff argued that the term enemy could not apply to
the French because the United States and France were not in a formally declared state of war. Id.
98. Id. at 43.
99. Id.
100. Talbot v. Seemen, 5 U.S. 1, 15, 17 (1801).
101. The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. at 666.
102. Id.
103. Bas, 4 U.S. at 40.
2002 / The Criminal-Enemy Distinction
The Vietnam War is a recent example of a war initiated by Congress without
passing a formal declaration of war. °4 The Southeast Asia Tonkin Gulf
Resolution, 1t0 codified on August 10, 1964, was the only express congressional
authorization initiating a war in Vietnam.'t0 In Orlando v. Laird, Army enlistees
challenged the U.S. government's constitutional authority to wage war in
Vietnam because the war was not formally declared.' ° The government
contended that the power to wage war in Vietnam is a "non-justiciable political
question. ' O° However, the court found that "the constitutional authority to
declare war is not a political question and hence presents a justiciable issue, if
plaintiffs can succeed in showing there are manageable standard to resolve the
controversy."' ' The Orlando court held that the manageable standard to
adjudicate the constitutional power to authorize a war is "whether there is any
104. See Statistics about the Vietnam War, at http://www.vhfcn.org/stat.htm (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (describing the casualties from the Vietnam War). In Vietnam approximately fifty-
eight thousand Americans were killed. Id. See also Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971) (stating that
"[cloncerning the hostilities in Southeast Asia, there is little difficulty in concluding that those hostilities
constitute war within the meaning of Article I, Section 8, Cl. I.").
105. Southeast Asia (Tonkin Gulf) Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408 (Aug. 10, 1964, repealed Dec. 31,
1970) reads in full:
Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked
United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a
serious threat to international peace; and Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and
systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging
against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and
Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has
no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be
left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as
Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of
the United States and to prevent further aggression.
Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance
of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United
States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President
determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or
protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its
freedom.
Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of
the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or
otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.
106. See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971) (stating that Congress, despite using
broad language, clearly demonstrated its intent to initiate the use of military force in Vietnam by passing the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution).
107. Id. at 1040.
108. See id. at 1041 (discussing the government's argument to apply the political question doctrine to
the case)
109. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553, 561 (1973).
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action by the Congress sufficient to authorize or ratify the military action in
question. ' ' 1 Finding continued mutual participation in the prosecution of the war,
the. Orlando court held that Congress met its constitutional burden to initiate a
limited war in Vietnam by passing the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and by
continually ratifying the war effort by appropriating funds to the military."'
After initiating the Vietnam War, Congress sought to curtail the President's
war-making powers by enacting the War Powers Resolution in 1973."' This
statute effectively limited the President's power to wage war independent of
Congressional authorization and oversight.' 13
The Persian Gulf War against Iraq in 1991 was initiated by Congress by
passing the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Iraq
Resolution)." 4 Most significantly, Congress reaffirmed its ability to initiate a
limited war, subsequent to 1973, by passing a "specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.""' 5
Congress has formally declared war eleven times on five different occasions
in its history, but the United States has engaged in limited wars on at least 125
different occasions since the adoption of the Constitution. 116 Thus, the history of
American warfare proves that Congress can pass a specific statutory
authorization to initiate a limited war against "places, persons, and things.""' If
the language of the congressional legislation is "sufficient to authorize the
110. Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1042.
111. Id.
112. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1541-1548 (West 1991 & Supp. 2002).
113. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 661 (3d ed. 2000).
114. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3
(1991) states in part:
(a) AUTHORIZATION-The President is authorized, subject to subsection (b), to use United States
Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to
achieve implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669,
670, 674, and 677.
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION THAT USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS
NECESSARY-Before exercising the authority granted in subsection (a), the President shall make
available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate
his determination that-
(1) the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain
compliance by Iraq with the United Nations Security Council resolutions cited in subsection
(a); and
(2) that those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.
(c) War Powers Resolution Requirements-
(I) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION-Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War
Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.
115. Id.
116. See Yoo, supra note 74, at 177 (listing the five occasions on which the United States has declared
war as: the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War (1848), the Spanish-American War (1898), World War I
(1914), and World War 11 (1941)).
117. Bas,4U.S.at4O.
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military activity at issue,''..8 as was the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, then the legislation
should satisfy the federal court's standard for a constitutional exercise of Congressional
war power.
2. The AUMF Compared
Congress clearly states that the AUMF is intended to be "specific statutory
authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution,"'"9 but
is the language of the AUMF constitutionally sufficient to initiate a limited war?
Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee,
commenting on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, stated that "he had been 'unaware of
the significance of the measure,' that its passage 'must stand as the only instance
in the nation's history in which Congress authorized war without knowing that it
was doing so."" 20 However, the language contained within the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution was sufficient to initiate a limited war in Vietnam.12 From 1964 to the
present, Congress has had prospective notice of the effect of using similar
language.
Compare "take all necessary measures"' 22 and "take all necessary steps,
including the use of armed force,"' 123 as used in the Tonkin Gulf resolution, to the
key language used in the AUMF which states, "use all necessary and appropriate
force."' 24 The first difference between the words "take" and "use" is not
significant. The next phrase "all necessary" is the same in both the AUMF and
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The AUMF replaces the words "measures" and
"steps, including the use of armed force," as found in the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution, with the term "force." The term "force" implies the meaning of
"military force," as inferred from the title, the "Authorization for Use of Military
Force." The AUMF does not use the words "measures," "steps," and "including,"
which suggests that Congress is sending a clear directive to use military force to
the President.
The language contained within the AUMF expressly and unambiguously
authorizes the use of military force.'2' Because the AUMF uses language similar
to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the AUMF should therefore be sufficient to
authorize the military action in question. Thus, federal courts should rely upon
the political question doctrine just as the Orlando court did in 1971, and refuse to
118. Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1043.
119. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
120. John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled) Constitutionality of the War
They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877, 885 (1990).
121. Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1042.
122. Southeast Asia (Tonkin Gulf) Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408 (Aug. 10, 1964).
123. Id.
124. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat, 224 (2001).
125. See id. (delineating in its title language the authorization for use of military force).
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adjudicate constitutional challenges to Congress' ability to initiate a limited war
against terrorism by passing the AUMF. Congress has therefore met its
constitutional burden to initiate a war, and the President, as Commander in Chief,
is therefore empowered to use military force to wage a war against the specific
targets enumerated in the AUMF.
C. Limiting a War Against Terrorism
1. Historical Power to Limit the Scope of Warfare
The AUMF initiates a war, 26 but against whom will the war be fought? And
how has Congress limited the use of military force? Chief Justice John Marshall
stated that "[t]he whole powers of war being, by the [C]onstitution of the United
States, vested in [C]ongress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our
guides in this inquiry."'
' 27
In a perfect war, the formal declaration of war states that the Commander in
Chief is "authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces
of the United States and the resources of the [glovernment," to fight the war until
a "successful termination."' '2 The declaration of war allows the Commander in
Chief to "carry on a war" without any special legislative restraint.' 29 This
language unleashed the full power of the Commander in Chief in World War II
because he was authorized to kill the enemy anywhere in the world, using any
level of force, including nuclear bombs, for any length of time, subject only to
the common law of war and existing legislation pertaining to the conduct and
operation of the military. "3
In a limited war, the statutes that authorize the use of military force also limit
the scope of warfare. 3 ' The war with France, in 1798, was limited by the
regulations contained within the legislation that authorized the use of military
force. The laws authorizing the war did not grant the President the power to
126. See Griffin B. Bell, Testimony of Griffin B. Bell Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, (Nov. 18,
2001), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/te112801f-bell.htm (copy on file with the McGeorge law Review)
(arguing that the AUMF initiates an undeclared war against terrorism).
127. Talbot v. Seemen, 5 U.S. 1,28 (1801).
128. Declaration of War Against Japan, Pub. L. No. 77-328, 55 Stat. 795 (Dec. 8, 1941).
129. Id.
130. See Military Analysis Network, World War I/, at http://www.fas.org/man/dodl0l/ops/world
_war_2.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the military
action in World War II and the extent of the President's power to wage war throughout the world, using any
level of force to destroy the enemies including nuclear weapons); Bas, 4 U.S. at 43 (stating, "If general war is
declared, its extent and operations are only restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a part of the law of
nations; but if a partial [war] is waged, its extent and operations depend on our municipal laws").
131. See Bas, 4 U.S. at 43 (stating that "if a [limited] war is waged, its extent and operation depend upon
our municipal laws"); id. at 40 (stating that in a imperfect or limited war, the person authorized to commit
hostilities must act under "special authority" and cannot act beyond the extent of his or her commission).
132. See generally Talbot, 5 U.S. at I (describing the series of laws authorizing the limited use of
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invade French territory or to confiscate French assets in America.133 Congress
initiated a maritime war, limiting the use of military force to confiscating French
ships on the high seas.14
More recently, the President's use of military force in the Persian Gulf War
was limited by several restrictions contained within the Iraq Resolution.'35 The
President had to show proof to Congress that all diplomatic channels for
resolving the conflict were exhausted before fighting the war against Iraq and
that the scope of military activity was limited to achieving U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, 677, and 678.116
The restrictions on the use of military force greatly hindered the United States'
ability to replace Saddam Hussein's regime.'37 The Commander in Chief did not
have the authorization from Congress to enter Baghdad and remove Hussein
from power.1
3 8
2. The A UMF Limits the War Against Terrorism
The President does not have authorization from Congress to destroy anyone
or anything he wants under the guise of the war against terrorism. The text of the
AUMF expressly limits the use of military force.'39 From 1798 to 1991, with the
consent of the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress has continued to authorize the
restricted use of military force by enumerating specific limitations within the
legislation that authorizes the military action.' 4° The AUMF, like its predecessors,
expressly limits the use of military force in the war against terrorism by
specifically defining what entities can be destroyed and by what level of force.
41
military force to capture French vessels).
133. See Bas, 4 U.S. at 43 (stating:
Congress has not declared war in general terms; but Congress has authorized hostilities on the
high seas by certain persons in certain cases. There is no authority given to commit hostilities
on land; to capture unarmed French vessels, nor even to capture French armed vessels lying
in a French port; and the authority is not given, indiscriminately, to every citizen of America,
against every citizen of France, but only to citizens appointed by commissions, or exposed to
immediate outrage and violence.).
134. Id.
135. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3
(1991) (outlining the restrictions on use of military force).
136. Id.; see H.J. Res. 77, U.N. SCOR, at 19-27 (1990), available at http://www.un.org/documents/
searchsc.htm (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (authorizing the coalition forces to use all
necessary means to force a withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, to enforce a trade embargo against Iraq and
to force Iraq to rescind the annexation of Kuwait).
137. See id. (not authorizing coalition forces to enter Baghdad to remove Saddam Hussein from power).
138. Id.
139. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
140. See supra Part IV.C.I (describing the various limited wars where the use of military force was
restricted by Congress through specific statutes).
141. See infra notes 146-75 and accompanying text (discussing the specific limitations Congress places
on the use of military force within the AUMF and the lack of other express limitations which suggest that
Congress has implied that there be no limitation in that area).
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First, the level of military force is limited. The AUMF states, "the President
is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force."' 42 The term "force"
implies the meaning of "military force," as inferred from the title of the AUMF.
The terms "necessary and appropriate" are significant because they allow
Congress to determine what levels of military force are necessary and appropriate
to achieve the enumerated goals of the AUMF. The U.S. Supreme Court would
not determine of whether a military action was necessary and appropriate
because this is clearly a political question in that there are no applicable
standards from which to guide the court as to whether a particular use of military
force is necessary or appropriate.'13 The President cannot determine what use of
force is necessary and appropriate because these terms, within the AUMF, would
cease to have meaning.' 44 Therefore, only Congress can determine whether a
particular military action is necessary and appropriate.
If Congress determines that a particular use of force is neither appropriate
nor necessary, it may curtail the activities of the Commander in Chief by passing
legislation further restricting the use of military force, 45 by limiting military
appropriations,' or by impeaching the President.1
47
Next, Congress limits the scope of the war against terrorism by limiting the
types of entities that the President can destroy through the use of necessary and
appropriate military force.' The AUMF first states that military force can be
used to destroy "nations, organizations, or persons."'' 49 This language specifies a
very broad class of entities and does not place any real limitation on the war
against terrorism.
The AUMF then states that the President is authorized to use military force
against entities that "planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons. '"" These clauses place express limitations on the use of military force.
The AUMF only creates five categories of entities that the President can use
military force against: (1) entities that planned, (2) entities that authorized, (3)
entities that committed, (4) entities that aided, or (5) entities that harbored the
142. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
143. See generally Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1042 (describing how the political question doctrine is applied
to questions involving levels of military force).
144. If the President were left with the power to decide if a particular use of force was necessary or
appropriate, then this clause would not serve to limit the President's power to use military force because he
could simply determine that all levels of military force were necessary and appropriate. If this were the case,
Congress would have no reason to include the language within the AUMF. The fact that Congress uses these
terms within the AUMF suggests that they have some meaning.
145. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
146. See TRIBE, supra note 113, at 664 (analyzing Congress's power to limit the President's use of the
military through appropriations).
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
148. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
149. Id.
150. Id.
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organizations or persons that committed the September 11 th attacks.'51 An entity
determined to be within one or more of these five categories will be referred to as
an "Enemy Terrorist" within this comment.
Usama Bin Laden is an Enemy Terrorist because he planned and authorized
the September 11 th attacks, as evidenced by his own admission."' The AUMF
therefore authorizes the President to use the necessary and appropriate military
force to destroy Bin Laden and any other Enemy Terrorist entities involved in
planning or authorizing the September 11 th attacks.
The nineteen September 11 th hijackers were all members of Al Qaeda and
are clearly Enemy Terrorists under the AUMF's committed category.'53
Every member of Al Qaeda should be classified as an Enemy Terrorist under
the aided category of the AUMF. Congress does not define what type of action
would constitute "aided" under the AUMF. However, if we refer to a definition
from section 904 of the UCMJ, Congress defines acts constituting aiding the
enemy as:
[a]ny person who:
(1) aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies,
money or other things; or
(2) without proper authority, knowingly harbors or protects or gives
intelligence to or communicates or corresponds with or holds any
intercourse with the enemy, either directly or indirectly.',4
If Usama Bin Laden was an enemy under the UCMJ, then, for example, a
member of the Al Qaeda need only have indirectly communicated with Usama
Bin Laden in order to have aided the enemy. Each member of Al Qaeda must
swear allegiance to Usama Bin Laden, and therefore, sworn members of Al
Qaeda would fall within the UCMJ's definition of aiding the enemy because their
oath of allegiance is either direct or indirect communication with the enemy
Usama Bin Laden. Therefore, if Congress intended to apply a definition of
"aided" within the AUMF that is as broad as the one found within the UCMJ,
then all sworn members of Al Qaeda aided the September 11 th attacks by aiding
Usama Bin Laden, the mastermind behind the attacks. Therefore, every sworn
member of Al Qaeda should be classified as an Enemy Terrorist under the
AUMF's "aided" category.
151. Id.
152. Bin Laden Videotape Transcript, supra note 56.
153. Supra Part 1.
154. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. § 904, art. 104 (West 1998 & Supp. 2002).
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S 155The use of military force against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is
authorized by the AUMF because the Taliban regime knowingly harbored the Al
Qaeda terrorists who planned and committed the September l1th attacks.'56
Therefore, the Taliban and other organizations or countries that harbor Al Qaeda
terrorists should be classified as Enemy Terrorists who can be destroyed in
accordance with the AUMF.1
57
The AUMF does not contain any geographic limitations on the President's
power to wage war.'58 The President is not restricted by geographic boundaries,
and he can engage in war anywhere in the world.5 9 This may mean that the
President is empowered to use military force within U.S. territories. President
Bush proclaimed, "[T]his is a war that must be fought not only overseas, but also
here at home.""l
The AUMF does not contain a "sunset" provision or any time restrictions. 6'
The war can therefore carry on in perpetuity.'62
The AUMF does not prohibit the use of military force against U.S. citizens.'63
At least one Al Qaeda member was determined to be a United States citizen.164
Therefore, some U.S. citizens may be Enemy Terrorists under the AUMF, and
the use of necessary and appropriate military force to destroy them may be
authorized by the AUMF.
Congress can also limit the war against terrorism through appropriations
because the President cannot fight a war without Congress supplying financial
• . 65
support for the military. Congress alone, through its spending power, can
appropriate funds for military activities.'6 On January 10, 2002, the President
155. Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training Camps and Taliban Military
Installations in Afghanistan, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 1432 (Oct. 7, 2001).
156. Linda D. Kozaryn, Franks: Al Qaeda's Safe Harbor Is Gone, American Forces Press Service
(Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/nO2072002_200202072.htm (copy on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
157. However, an invasion of Iraq in 2002 should not be authorized by the AUMF unless the President
determines that either Saddam Hussein or the Iraqi government is an Enemy Terrorist. In other words, if Iraq is
linked to harboring or planning the September 1 th terrorist attacks, the AUMF would authorize the use of
military force against Iraq; however, absent such a finding, the AUMF would not authorize the use of military
force against Iraq.
158. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
159. See generally Bas, 4 U.S. 1 (discussing the powers of the Commander in Chief in a limited war; the
President possesses all of the powers of the Commander in Chief, except for those which Congress has
restricted). If Congress has not restricted the use of military force by geographic boundaries, then Congress may
have authorized the use of military force in any region or place in the world. Id.
160. Address to Joint Session, supra note 42.
161. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See infra Part V.B.l.b.i (describing Wadih al Hage as both a U.S. citizen and an as Al Qaeda
member at the time of the African Embassy bombings).
165. TRIBE, supra note 113, at 669.
166. Id.
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signed the "Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act,
2002. '67 In this Bill, Congress provided $317.6 billion for national security
programs administered by the Department of Defense.16 The appropriation
specifically authorizes expeditures to fund the military to fight the war against
terrorism.'69
3. Enemy Terrorists are Enemies at War
Congress' enumerated war powers enable it to create a class of enemy entities.'70
In a perfect war, the status of "enemy" arises after Congress formally declares war
against a Nation.' 7' Any legal entity, including persons, corporations, associations,
and organizations, that resides within the enemy nation's territory recieves the
status of "enemy" by virtue of its residence. 72 In World War II, German and
Japanese citizens were determined to be enemies because they lived within the
enemy country's territory.173
The standard that defines the enemy in a perfect war is not applicable to the
war against terrorism. Congress cannot create a class of enemy in the war against
terrorism by declaring war against a nation because, as Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld stated, "[t]his is not a war against an individual, a group, a religion or a
country. Rather, our opponent is a global network of terrorist organizations and
their state sponsors. ,,174 "But the terrorists who threaten us are not only in
Afghanistan. They operate in dozens of countries-including the United
States."' 75 Therefore, in the war against terrorism, Congress must seek an
alternative method of defining the enemy to be destroyed.
In 1798, Congress authorized limited use of military force against France
through several statutes.'76 The relative situation between the United States and
167. Pub. L. No. 107-117 (Jan. 10, 2002).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 65-91, H.R. 4960 (Oct. 6, 1917) (defining the
Congressional power to regulate and punish the enemy in war).
171. Id.
172. See id. (defining the word "enemy" under the "Trading with the Enemy Act").
173. Id.
174. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, A New Kind of War, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 27,
2001), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s200 (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
175. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Prepared Statement, Senate Armed Services Committee
"Military Commissions," Washington D.C. (Dec. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Rumsfeld Prepared Statement],
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s20011212-depsecdef2.html (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
176. See Bas, 4 U.S. at 41 (describing the nature of the hostilities between the United States and France).
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France was that of "a qualified maritime war" '177 Supreme Court Justice Moore
described the situation as a "scene of bloodshed, depredation and confiscation....""'
Congress had raised an army, stopped all intercourse with France,
dissolved our treaty, built and equipped ships of war, and commissioned
private armed ships; enjoining the former, and authorizing the latter, to
defend themselves against the armed ships of France, to attack them on
the high seas, to subdue and take them as prize, and to re-capture armed
vessels found... If they were not our enemies, I know not what
constitutes an enemy.179
Every justice who opined on the subject in the case stated that, even though
Congress had not expressly declared war, the character of enemy necessarily
arose from the state of the conflict. "8o
In the war against terrorism, the "scene of bloodshed, depredation, and
confiscation" is obvious; therefore, from such a state, the character of enemy
would seem to necessarily arise. Approximately three thousand Americans were
killed in the September 11 th terrorist attacks.'' Through the AUMF, Congress
authorized the President to raise and employ the military.12 President Bush began
the offensive under Operation Enduring Freedom and attacked the terrorist
regime in Afghanistan."' The President stated that Usama Bin Laden was
"wanted, dead or alive."' 84 The President authorized both the confiscation of
assets belonging to terrorists and terrorist affiliates.'
The AUMF authorizes the President to attack Enemy Terrorists.'16 Although
Congress did not expressly label any entity as an enemy in war, lSfrom "such a
state of things it is scarcely necessary to add that term 'enemy."" 8 Congress
intended to apply the status of "enemy" to Enemy Terrorists when it authorized
their destruction."9 By authorizing the use of military force against a specific
177. Id. at 38.
178. Id. at 39.
179. Id. at 41.
180. Id. at 39, 40, 44, 46.
181. See supra Part I (describing the horrific attacks that occurred September 11, 2001).
182. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
183. Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training Camps and Taliban Military
Installations in Afghanistan, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 1432 (Oct. 7, 2001).
184. Id.
185. Jim Garamone, Bush Launches First Strike-On Terrorists' Money, American Forces Press
Service, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 24, 2001), at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ep2001/n09242001_200
109244.html (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
186. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
187. Id.
188. Bas, 4 U.S. at 46.
189. See id. at 44 (describing how Congress can confer the status of "enemy" in a limited war, when
stating "[t]he designation of 'enemy' extends to a case of perfect war; but as a general designation, it surely
includes the less, as well as the greater, species of warfare, If [C]ongress had chosen to declare a general war,
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class of entities, Congress has thereby created a limited class of enemies in the
war against terrorism.' 90 Enemy Terrorists are enemies at war with the United
States.
The AUMF authorizes the President to use necessary and appropriate
military force against entities "he determines" are Enemy Terrorists responsible
directly or indirectly for the events of September 11, 2001."' This language is
cause for some concern because Congress may have delegated its Article I War
Powers, specifically its power to create an enemy, to the President. If the
President can define who is an enemy at war with the United States, then he
essentially has the power to declare war upon any entity at his prerogative. This
would clearly be an unconstitutional delegation of war powers.' 9 However,
Congress intends for the President to determine what entities fall within the
limited class of enemy enumerated by the AUMF. 93 The President is not
necessarily empowered to create a new class of enemies, but he is empowered to
determine if an entity is an Enemy Terrorist as established by the AUMF.'
4
V. PROSECUTING THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM
A. Military Force
1. The Commander in Chief
The Constitution states that "[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United States.... ."'9 It also empowers
him to appoint and commission officers of the United States)96
However, the Constitution allows the extent of the Commander in Chief's
power to use military force to be limited by Congressional statutory restraints.19
The Constitution confers on the President the "executive Power,"' " and imposes
on him the duty to "take are that the Laws be faithfully executed. . . ."99 Justice
Jackson stated in his concurring opinion from Youngstown Steel and Tube v.
France would have been a general enemy; having chosen to wage a partial war, France was, at the time of the
capture, only a partial enemy; but still she was an enemy.").
190. Id.
191. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
192. See TRIBE, supra note 113, at 661 (discussing the "President determines" clause of the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution as possibly being an unconstitutional delegation of congressional authority).
193. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
194. Id.
195. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
196. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
197. See supra Part IV (describing the limitation placed on the use of military force in a limited war).
198. U.S. CONST. art. Ii, § 1, ci. 1.
199. Id.
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Sawyer that, "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that
he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.""" Therefore,
the Commander in Chief's constitutional authority to prosecute the war against
terrorism is at its zenith when the President acts pursuant to the AUMF and other
Congressional legislation pertaining to the war against terrorism.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated quite clearly that "[w]e are at
war., 20 1 Congress authorizes the Commander in Chief to use military force to
destroy entities he determines are within the AUMF's five classes of Enemy
Terrorists.' °2 Therefore, the Commander in Chief acts constitutionally as long as
he only uses necessary and appropriate military force against Enemy Terrorists.
B. Military Justice
1. Applicable Law: The Jus Belli 20
On November 13, 2001, President Bush signed a military order that declared
military tribunal jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence certain persons in the
war against terrorism. 2°4 The President derived his authority 2  to enact the
military order from his inherent powers as Commander in Chief, the AUMF, and
sections 821 and 836 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 2 6
However, neither the AUMF nor the UCMJ expressly authorize the use of the
military justice system to try Enemy Terrorists. 27
The UCMJ is "part of our body of law as a whole and is fully recognized by
civil courts; it is in force in time of peace as well as in time of war."" Congress
enacted the UCMJ in 1951, to confer upon the military concurrent jurisdiction to
try certain persons subject to the laws of wary,
200. Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1948).
201. Rumsfeld Prepared Statement, supra note 175.
202. See supra note 71 (providing the full text of the AUMF which authorizes the use of military force
against those who planned, authorized, committed, aided, or harbored such persons involved in, terrorist
activity).
203. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 858 (7th ed. 1991) (defining Jus Belli as Latin for the "Law of
War" which is "[t]he law of nations as applied during wartime, defining in particular the rights and duties of the
belligerent powers and of neutral nations.").
204. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
205. Id.
206. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-946.146 (West 1998 & Supp. 2002).
207. See Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(which does not mention military tribunals); Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-946.146
(which does not mention any specific enemy over which the military has jurisdiction).
208. Legal Information Institute, Military Law: An Overview, at http://www.law.comell.edu/topics/
military.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
209. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. § 818, art. 18 (stating that "[gleneral courts-
martial also have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal
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The U.S. Supreme Court defines the law of war as "including that part of the
law of nations that prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties
of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals." 2 0 Also, the application of the
211law of war is not limited to nations engaged in a formalized perfect war. In
1800, Chief Justice John Marshall stated that:
[i]t is not denied, nor in the course of the argument has it been denied,
that [C]ongress may authorize general hostilities, in which case the
general laws of war apply to our situation; or partial hostilities, in which
case the laws of war, so far as they actually apply to our situation, must
be noticed.2 2
The law of war is an amorphous concept based primarily on international
custom, military law, and treaties.2 " The Department of Defense defines the law
of war as:
[t]hat part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed
hostilities. It is often called the law of armed conflict. The law of war
encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding
on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and
international agreements to which the United States is a party, and
applicable customary international law. l4
The law of war is designed to regulate armed conflict according to the most
humanitarian means possible."' Fundamental to the law of war is the distinction
between civilians and combatants.' The U.S. Supreme Court states that "[b]y
universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a distinction between the
armed forces and the peaceful populations. .. Therefore, in any conflict, a
person is either a combatant or a civilian.
and may adjudge any punishment permitted by the law of war."); John S. Cooke, Fiftieth Anniversary of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice Symposium Edition, 165 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (discussing the UCMJ); Air
Force ROTC, The Evolution and Jurisdiction of Military Law, at http://www.southalabama.edu/afROTC/
AS434_SSG_01.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2002) [hereinafter The Evolution and Jusidiction of Military Law]
(copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (examining the development of military law).
210. Exparte Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942).
211. Talbot v. Seemen, 5 U.S. 1,28 (1801).
212. See id. (supporting that the law of war may be applied to individual Enemy Terrorists in the limited
war against terrorism).
213. Jennifer Elsea, Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying Terrorists as War Criminals Before Military
Commissions, CRS Report for Congress (Dec. 11, 2001) at 6.
214. Department of Defense Directive, Law of War Number 5100.77, § 3.1 (Dec. 9, 1998).
215. See Elsea, supra note 213, at 7-8 (discussing the responsibilities to adhere to appropriate humane
and chivalrous principles).
216. Id. at 8-9.
217. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
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Combatants are members of an armed force engaged in a conflict.218 The
Geneva Convention III defines lawful combatants as:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed
forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a
Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory,
even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or
volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements,
fulfil the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.1 9
Al Qaeda's military structure should fall within the Geneva Convention's
definition of a combatant because members of Al Qaeda are organized under a
22021
command and control structure, use armed force, 2 and are a party to a
conflict.
22
a. Al Qaeda Is an Armed Force
Usama Bin Laden is the political and spiritual leader of Al Qaeda.223
Al Qaeda had a command and control structure which included a
majlis al shura (or consultation council) which discussed and
approved major undertakings, including terrorist operations.2 Al
218. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4, at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/ (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
219. Id.
220. Infra Part V.B.l.a.
221. Infra Part V.B. 1.b.
222. Infra at Part V.B.l.c.
223. Moussaoui Indictment, supra note 30, at 5.
224. Id. at 3.
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Qaeda also had a 'military committee' which considered and
approved 'military' matters. 2' Members of [A]l Qaeda pledged an
oath of allegiance (called a "bayat") to Usama [B]in Laden, and [A]l
Qaeda. 22 Those suspected of collaborating against [A]l Qaeda were
to be identified and killed. 227
Since at least 1989 .... Bin Laden and the terrorist group [A]l Qaeda
sponsored, managed, and/or financially supported training camps in
Afghanistan, which camps were used to [teach] use of firearms,
explosives, chemical weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction 2
[T]hese camps were used to conduct operational planning against United
States targets around the world and experiments in the use of chemical
229
and biological weapons.
b. Al Qaeda Members are Party to a Conflict
On August 23, 1996, Usama Bin Laden issued a "declaration of war" against
the United States .2 Bin Laden disseminated the "Message from Usamah Bin-
Muhammad Bin-Laden to His Muslim Brothers in the Whole World and
Especially in the Arabian Peninsula: Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans
Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques; Expel the Heretics from the
Arabian Peninsula. ..""
On February 23, 1998, a Palestinian newspaper published a writing from
Usama Bin Laden. It stated in part:
[l]n compliance with God's order, we issue the following fatwa to all
Muslims
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies-civilians and
military-is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any
country in which it is possible to do it ... in order for their armies to
move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any
Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, "and
fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together," and "fight
225. Id.
226. Id. at I.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 3.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 8 (discussing the war against Americans); see generally YOSSEF BODANSKY, BIN LADEN,
THE MAN WHO DECLARED WAR ON AMERICA (Prima Publishing 1998) (discussing how Usama Bin Laden
formally declared war on the United States and then systematically attacked U.S. targets).
231. Moussaoui Indictment, supra note 30, at 8.
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them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice
and faith in God.,
232
The U.S. State Department classified this fatwah as an "intention to attack
Americans and our allies, including civilians, anywhere in the world. ' ' 233 As the
new millennium approached, Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda entered a new
phase of a long and deliberate terrorist campaign.
i. The African Embassies
On August 7, 1998, the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania were bombed. 234 On the morning of Friday, August 7, 1998, a
suicide bomber detonated a truck loaded with explosives about thirty-five feet
from the outer wall of the Embassy in Dar Es Salaam.235 The bombing resulted in
eleven confirmed deaths, one person missing and presumed dead, and another
236
eighty-five people injured.
The same day, terrorists detonated a truck bomb near the basement of the
American Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.237
A total of 213 people were killed, of whom 44 were American Embassy
employees (12 Americans and 32 Foreign Service National
employees). 23' Ten Americans and eleven [Foreign Service Nationals]
were seriously injured.239An estimated 200 Kenyan civilians were killed
and 4,000 were injured by the blast in the vicinity of the embassy. °
The evidence proved Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda were directly linked,
to both embassy bombings.24' Wadih El Hage, a United States citizen at the time
232. Text of Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans, Feb. 23, 1998, at http://www.ict.org.illarticles/
fatwah.htm (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
233. FACT SHEET, supra note 49.
234. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, REPORT OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARDS BOMBINGS OF THE
U.S. EMBASSIES IN NAIROBI, KENYA AND DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA ON AUGUST 7, 1998 (Jan. 1999)
[hereinafter DAR ES SALAAM REPORT], at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/boarddaressalaam.html
(copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review); U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, REPORT OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY
REVIEW BOARDS BOMBINGS OF THE U.S. EMBASSIES IN NAIROBI, KENYA AND DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA ON
AUGUST 7, 1998 (Jan. 1999) [hereinafter NAIROBI REPORT], at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/
boardnairobi.html (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
235. DAR ES SALAAM Report, supra note 234.
236. Id.
237. Nairobi Report, supra note 234.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Orriana Zill, A Portrait of Wadih El Hage, Accused Terrorist, PBS Frontline, Sept. 13, 2001, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/elhage.html (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (presenting biographical information on accused terrorists, Wadih El Hage).
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of the embassy bombings, was a leader of the Al Qaeda cell in Nairobi, and at
one time he was Usama Bin Laden's personal assistant. 242 El Hage was caught,
prosecuted, and convicted for his involvement in the bombings. 243
ii. The Millennium Los Angeles International Airport Bombing Plot
On December 14, 1999, Ahmed Ressam, a thirty-two-year-old Algerian,
crossed the United States-Canada border with a false Canadian passport and was
arrested in Port Angeles, Washington, with more than one hundred pounds of
explosives in his car.2 Ressam testified at trial against a co-conspirator as to how
terrorist cells operate in Canada and the United States and how Usama Bin
Laden's terrorist training camps work in Afghanistan. 45 Ressam lived in the
Montreal headquarters of a terrorist cell called the Armed Islamic Group, or
GIA.24 GIA is a global terrorist network that extends from North Africa to
Canada, and from France to Afghanistan.24 In 1998, Ressam went to Usama Bin
Laden's "Jihad University" in Afghanistan and "trained for eight months in a
sophisticated terrorist curriculum, receiving instruction in the use of a range of
deadly weapons, including explosives and cyanide gas, and in the covert
techniques of assassination and the sabotage of a country's infrastructure."24
Ressam was apprehended while he was headed for Los Angeles International
Airport (LAX), where he planned to detonate the car bomb in a LAX terminal on
New Year's Eve.249
iii. USS Cole
On October 12, 2000, suicide bombers used explosives to attack the USS
Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen. The attack resulted in the deaths of seventeen
U.S. service members and injured another thirty-nine.5 Usama Bin Laden
produced a videotape containing images of the USS Cole after it was nearly sunk
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Terence McKenna, Trail of a Terrorist, PBS Frontline, Oct. 25, 2001 [hereinafter Trail of a
Terrorist], at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pageslfrontline/shows/trailletc/synopsis.html (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
245. See A Terrorist's Testimony, PBS Frontline, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
trail/inside/testimony.html (last visited May 14, 20002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(excerpting testimony of Ressam before the federal district court of the Southern District of New York).
246. Trail of a Terrorist, supra note 244.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Video Shows Bin Laden Urging Muslims to Prepare for Fighting, CNN.com, June 21, 2001, at
http://www.8.cnn.com/2001fWORLD/europe/06/2 l/video.binladen/index.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2002) (copy
on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
251. Id.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
by the suicide bombers and used the tape for Al Qaeda member recruitment."'
Voices on the tape gave thanks to Allah "who made us victorious the day we
destroyed the ship on the sea."253 Usama Bin Laden comments on the tape that "in
the sea, they charged the destroyer that is fearsome to some, one that evokes
horror when it docks and when it sails,"2M and "[t]o all the Mujahedeen, your
brothers in Palestine are waiting for you, it's time to penetrate America and Israel
and hit them where it hurts most."25 U.S. officials suspect Usama Bin Laden
masterminded the USS Cole attack.
256
iv. September 11th
"[O]n September 1lth, 2001, terrorists hijacked and destroyed four civilian
aircrafts, crashing two of them into the towers of the World Trade Center in New
York City and crashing a third into the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C.,"
killing thousands of American civilians.257 The September 11 th attacks were part
of a systematic campaign, orchestrated by Usama Bin Laden, executed by Al
Qaeda agents, and designed to destroy America's influence in the Muslim world.
c. Al Qaeda Agents are Combatants
Al Qaeda is an armed force comprised of sworn members that use military
force to further political goals.5' Al Qaeda agents are not just criminals, they are
organized under a command-and-control structure that is fighting a "declared
war" against the United States. 259 Al Qaeda is therefore a military organization,
and it is clearly a party to the conflict in the war against terrorism.26° Al Qaeda
Enemy Terrorists are as either active military personnel or person serving with an
armed force in the field during a time of war.2 6' Therefore, members of Al Qaeda
should be classified as combatants, not as civilians, because Al Qaeda agents
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Act of September 18, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-39, 115 Stat. 222 (2001).
258. Moussaoui Indictment, supra note 30, at 1-3 (describing the goals, organization, and infrastructure
of the Al Qaeda).
259. See supra Part V.B. l.a-b (analyzing the military organization of Al Qaeda and its operations).
260. Id.
261. See William P. Barr, Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism, Testimony of
William P. Barr Former Attorney General of the United States Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the
United States Senate Department of Justice Oversight (Nov. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Barr Testimony], available
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/te 112801 f-barr.htm (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing Al
Qaeda as a "highly-organized foreign armed force" that has "openly proclaimed war against the United States").
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willfully choose to live as combatants as they systematically attack U.S. and
262foreign targets.
2. Violating the Law of War
The AUMF makes Al Qaeda and other Enemy Terrorists "enemies" at war.
Al Qaeda, and other Enemy Terrorists combatants found within the United States
in violation of the law of war are enemy belligerents and unlawful combatants
and, if captured, are subject to being tried, convicted, and executed under a
system of military justice. 63 As the U.S. Supreme Court states:
Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of
war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise
subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial
and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their
belligerency unlawful. 264
Congress chose not to codify violations against the law of war within federal
law; instead it adopted the system of common law as applied by military
tribunals.' 6' The U.S. Supreme Court defines violations against the common law
of war as:
[A]n enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the
lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are
familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be
entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the
266law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals.
Therefore, enemy "combatants must distinguish themselves from civilians by
a uniform or other distinctive sign recognizable at a distance" in order to avoid
the unlawful attack upon civilians.267
Al Qaeda training camps teach their agents security and counterintelligence
methods, how to use codes and passwords, and how to travel within the United
262. Supra Part V.B.l.a-b.
263. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 (holding that enemy combatants found within the United States
in violation of the law of war may be tried and sentenced within the military justice system).
264. Id. at 39.
265. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. § 818 (West 1998 & Supp. 2002); Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. at 30.
266. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39.
267. The Geneva Convention on P.O.W.'s, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/01/29/internatinal/29Geneva.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (summarizing the main provisions of the Third Geneva Convention, which "define the conduct of
combatants and the protection of prisoners of war").
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Stats wileperfrmig . 265States while performing operations. Al Qaeda agents who infiltrate the United
States are specifically told to dress in Western attire with shaved beards.2 69 If Al
Qaeda agents are found within the United States without a uniform, or distinctive
emblem or sign, they are therefore enemy belligerents and unlawful enemy
combatants.
The Al Qaeda Enemy Terrorists who executed the September 1 th terrorist
attacks entered the United States and wore no uniforms or any sign indicating
that they were part of a military force that had declared war on the United
States."o These Al Qaeda agents were clearly unlawful Enemy Terrorists."' If
captured, these Al Qaeda agents would not be entitled to prisoner of war status
and could be tried and sentenced within a military tribunal that applies the law of
272
war.
3. Military Jurisdiction Over Al Qaeda: Bush's Military Order
President Bush passed a military order (Military Order) to try specific classes
• 273
of persons within military tribunals in the war against terrorism. However, the
President does not have the authority under the Constitution to create or expand
274 275the jurisdiction of the military tribunals. In Madsen v. Kinsella, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the authority to create military tribunals originates from
Congress's power to declare war.276 Congress alone has the power to regulate the
jurisdiction of the military courts because it can regulate the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts, 277 define and punish offenses against the law of nations2
make all laws regulating the armed forces,279 and limit and control the use of
military force, including military justice, in the war against terrorism.0
268. Moussoaui Indictment, supra note 30, at 7.
269. See id. (stating that Al Qaeda agents infiltrating the United States were told to wear Western attire
and use other methods to avoid detection by security).
270. Id.
271. Elsea, supra note 213, at 16.
272. See Barr, supra note 261 (arguing that Al Qaeda agents are unlawful belligerents and are subject to
the laws of war).
273. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
274. See Neal Katyal, DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism,
Address Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Nov. 28, 2001) (arguing that Congress alone has the power to
convene military tribunals).
275. 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
276. Id. at 346 n.9.
277. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
278. Id.
279. Id. art. I, § 8.
280. See supra Part IV.C (discussing Congress's power to limit the use of military force in an
undeclared war).
2002 / The Criminal-Enemy Distinction
In a time of war, the UCMJ and the common law of war act together to grant
the military concurrent jurisdiction over enemies at war captured within the
United States.28' The persons subject to the jurisdiction of the military under the
UCMJ include all active military personnel, prisoners of war,8 in time of war
persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field,284 or any
person who aids or attempts to aid the enemy.285
Congress has not expressly authorized military jurisdiction over captured
unlawful Enemy Terrorist combatants. 286 However, Congress has initiated a war
against Enemy Terrorists by passing the AUMF. 287 Al Qaeda and other Enemy
Terrorist combatants have therefore become "enemy" combatants in the war
against terrorism. Therefore, the AUMF, the UCMJ, and the common law of war
act in concert to confer upon the military concurrent jurisdiction over captured Al
Qaeda and other Enemy Terrorists who are active military personnel, persons
serving with an armed force in the field, or persons aiding the enemy.
21 8
However; the enemies in the war against terrorism are limited by the AUMF
to Enemy Terrorists. The UCMJ only grants the military concurrent jurisdiction
over unlawful enemy combatants at war with the United States, 290 and therefore,
the military can only gain concurrent jurisdiction over unlawful Enemy Terrorist
combatants.29' Because Congress alone has the power to expand the jurisdiction
of the military courts, the President cannot create any rules within Bush's
Military Order that are contrary to or inconsistent with the UCMJ or the
AUMF.292
281. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 818, 821 (West 1998 & Supp. 2002); see Ex
parte Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (describing how the common law of war allows the military to
assume jurisdiction over unlawful enemy combatants during a time of war, yet still allowing habeas corpus
review of their detention); The Evolution and Jurisdiction of Military Law, supra note 209 (stating that the
UCMJ allows concurrent jurisdiction over certain offenses and offenders within the U.S. territory).
282. 10 U.S.C.A. § 802, art. 2(a)(l).
283. Id. § 802, art. 2(a)(9).
284. Id. § 802, art. 2(a)(10).
285. See id. § 818 (stating that the military has "jurisdiction to try persons subject to this chapter for any
offense made punishable by this chapter..."); supra note 154 and accompanying text (quoting section 904 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
286. Katyal, supra note 274.
287. See Griffin B. Bell, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Nov. 28, 2001), available
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/tel 12801f-bell.htm (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that
"war has been authorized by the Congress through ... Public Law 107-40 (AUMF)").
288. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. § 821, art. 21 (West 1998 & Supp. 2002)
(limiting military jurisdiction to concurrent jurisdiction); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39 (stating that the
common law of war allows military concurrent jurisdiction over unlawful military combatants during a time of
war); Barr, supra note 261 (testifying to the AUMF and UCMJ powers in relation to unlawful combatants).
289. Supra Part IV.C.2-3 (describing the AUMF limitations on the types of entities subject to military
force).
290. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. § 821, art. 2(a)(1); § 904, art. 104.
291. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39 (stating that the military can gain jurisdiction over unlawful
enemy combatants).
292. See Katyal, supra note 274 (describing the President's actions as an intrusion upon the doctrine of
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
The Military Order states that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction over
the "individuals subject to this order."293 The term "individuals subject to this
295
order"294 means any individual who is not a United States citizen, whom the
President has "reason to believe"29 from "time to time in writing"297 is: an Al
Qaeda member (past or present)' 9' has "engaged in, aided or abetted, conspired to
commit acts of international terrorism;"29 threatened or aimed to cause "injury to
or adverse affects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign
policy, economy; '  or knowingly harbored an individual subject to the order.30
The AUMF is very broad in defining Enemy Terrorists. To qualify as an
Enemy Terrorist, a person needs only to have "aided" the terrorists who
perpetrated the September 11 th terrorist attacks.3  The Military Order exceeds
the AUMF as it attempts to grant to the military jurisdiction over persons who
have "caused or threatened to cause" "adverse effects" to the United States, its
citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy. 3°3 This clause is overbroad
and therefore violates the separation of powers doctrine because President Bush
is intruding upon the role of the Legislature by expanding the jurisdiction of the
Article II courts.)
The Military Order states that military commissions will have exclusive
jurisdiction to try individuals "subject to this order." ' The trials will be held in
secret, and the convicted cannot seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding
in any court within the United States or in an international court. 3i0 Section 821 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, as relied upon by the President in the
Military Order, refers to the military as having concurrent jurisdiction. The
separation of powers because by issuing the military order "the Executive Branch is acting as a lawmaker, law
enforcer and judge").
293. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 13, 2001).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
303. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 13, 2001).
304. Katyal, supra note 274.
305. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 57,834.
306. See generally Katyal, supra note 274 (discussing military tribunals).
307. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 57,835-57,836.
308. See id. (restricting an individual's ability to seek a remedy or bring a proceeding in any non-
military court system).
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U.S. Supreme Court has consistently upheld the right of habeas corpus review for
enemy combatants tried in military tribunals. 3°9 The Military Order is overbroad
because it strips the federal courts of concurrent jurisdiction and denies enemy
combatants habeas corpus review." ° Only Congress can limit or extend the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.31" ' Therefore this part of the Military Order
arguably violates the separation of powers doctrine and is therefore unconstitutional.
The military tribunals may be set up within the United States and they will
"sit at any time and any place."3 2 The Secretary of Defense shall issue orders and
regulations necessary for the trial.3"3 Evidence is admitted if it has "probative
value to a reasonable person. 3 4 The military commission will sit as "triers both
of fact and law."3 5 A conviction requires only two-thirds concurrence, if a
majority of the members of the commission are present. 316 The convicted may be
sentenced to life in prison or death.3 7
The Military Order allows the military tribunals to apply the law of war to
unlawful Enemy Terrorists.3 8 When an enemy combatant is found in violation of
the law of war, the military tribunals apply the law of war, not the civil law, to
adjudicate and punish the unlawful combatant.3"9 The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments do not apply to enemies at war.32° By labeling Enemy Terrorists as
enemies at war, when these enemies are combatants and their activities make
them unlawful, they lose the constitutional protections afforded to ordinary
criminal defendants. Therefore, unlawful Enemy Terrorist combatants, like Al
Qaeda agents found within the United States, are not entitled to any
constitutional protections in military courts.32' U.S. Supreme Court precedent
may support this proposition even in a case where an unlawful enemy combatant
is a U.S. citizen.
309. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37.
310. Katyal, supra note 274.
311. Id.
312. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57,833, 57,835 (Nov. 13, 2001).
313. Id. at 57,834-57,835; see id. (stating that the orders and regulations include "pretrial, trial, and post-
trial procedures, modes of proof, issuance of process, and qualifications of attorneys").
314. Id. at 57,835.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. § 818 (West 1998 & Supp. 2002); see Barr, supra
note 261 (advocating the use of military tribunals to prosecute terrorists).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
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- . 4. Case Precedent
The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the use of military tribunals to try
persons found in violation of the law of war.12 There is a conflict found in the
case precedent between two cases: Ex parte Milligan3 23 and Ex parte Quirin.3 4
However, the differences in these two cases can be reconciled by developing an
understanding of how the current U.S. Supreme Court may view the use of
military commissions to try unlawful Enemy Terrorist combatants in the war
against terrorism.
The court in Milligan found that offenses committed by non-military U.S.
citizens can never be tried in military courts when the civil courts are open. 3'2 In
August 1864, military authorities charged a lawyer named Lambdin P. Milligan
and four others with conspiracy against the government of the United States,
conspiracy to aid the rebellion, and conspiracy to overthrow the government of
the United States.326 The government tried "these defendants before a military
commission, rather than a civil court. 3 27 On October 21, 1864, Milligan was
brought before a military commission, tried, found guilty, and sentenced to be
hanged.12' The trial before the military commission denied Milligan many
procedural rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the Constitution including:
right to jury trial and a death sentence by two-thirds vote. 329 On May 10, 1865,
Milligan petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that the military commission
had no jurisdiction to try him.33 The court held that "a United States citizen not
in the armed forces could not be tried before a military commission even in time
of war if the civil courts were open for business."33'
Milligan is factually distinguishable from the war against terrorism. First,
Milligan occurred during the U.S. Civil War, a war fought predominately against
332U.S. state citizens. In contrast, the war against terrorism is fought against
international terrorist organizations composed of predominately foreign
nationals.333 Second, Milligan was found to have not served with a military
322. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1.
323. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
324. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
325. Id. at 29.
326. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 107-109; William H. Rehnquist, Civil Liberty and the Civil War: The
Indianapolis Treason Trials, Remarks Delivered at the Indiana University School of Law, Bloomifigton (Oct.
28, 1996) [hereinafter Rehnquist Remarks].
327. Rehnquist Remarks, supra note 326.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 107-09
331. Rehnquist Remarks, supra note 326.
332. id.
333. See supra Part II.B-C (describing the general make-up of the Al Qaeda and its role in the war
against terrorism); see also supra Part V.B. L.b (describing Al Qaeda members as parties to a conflict).
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force. 34 Al Qaeda terrorists however are clearly part of a military organization."'
Third, the magnitude of the destruction caused by the September 11 th attacks-
the death of nearly three thousand people-can only be compared to an act of
336war. The Japanese killed nearly 2,400 Americans on December 7, 1941. When
the death toll reaches the thousands the act enters a new realm, comparable only
to war. Finally, Quirin was decided more recently and may have overruled parts
of Milligan.337
Quirin provides a closer analogy to the war against terrorism.338 While the
United States and Germany were at war in 1942, Herbert Haupt, a U.S. citizen,
Richard Quirin, and six other German soldiers were trained in the use of
explosives and secret writing at a sabotage school near Berlin.33 9 The eight
saboteurs entered the United States via submarine, exchanged their German
uniforms for U.S. civilian clothes, and set out on a mission to destroy U.S. war
industries.4 The FBI arrested all eight saboteurs and surrendered them to the
custody of the military.4'
On July 2, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a Military OrderM42
and a Proclamation43 designed to combat sabotage and espionage within the
United States. 3 German and Japanese enemy combatants found in violation of
the laws of war, were to be tried under the military justice model.M 5 President
Roosevelt then appointed a military commission to try Quirin and the other
saboteurs and he directed that the defendants have no access to civil courts. 3 The
military commission tried the offenders for violating the law of war and
convicted and sentenced all eight prisoners to death. 47 In doing so, the military
commissions denied the petitioners of Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantees
belonging to criminal defendants. 3'5
334. Rehnquist Remarks, supra note 326.
335. See supra Part V.B.I.b (establishing Al Qaeda's goal of organized and deliberate attacks on the
United States).
336. Remembering Pearl Harbor, supra note 84.
337. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1; Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2.
338. See Barr, supra note 261 (comparing Quirin to the war against terrorism).
339. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Appointment of a Military Commission, 7 Fed. Reg. 5,103 (July 7, 1942).
343. See Enemies Denied Access to United States, 7 Fed. Reg. 5,101 (July 7, 1942) (stating that, "[a]ll
persons who are subjects, citizens, or residents of any nation at war with the United States ... shall be subject to
the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals.").
344. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22-23 (stating that the Military Order applied to those charged with
"committing or attempting to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of
war").
345. See id. (stating that the Military Order applied to "all persons who are subjects, citizens, or
residents of any nation at war with the United States").
346. See id. (outlining the Military Order and the use of military tribunals for specially charged crimes).
347. Rehnquist Remarks, supra note 326.
348. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24 (discussing how Quirin and the other German saboteurs were denied Fifth
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The U.S. Supreme Court granted Quirin and the other eight prisoners review
of the procedures under which they were being tried. 4' Relying on Milligan, it
argued that the government could not resort to trial by -a military commission
because the civil courts throughout the United States were open and there had
been no invasion of any part of the country.3' ° The petitioners stressed the holding
in Milligan, stating that the law of war "can never be applied to citizens and
states which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts
are open and their process unobstructed.""35 The court held that even U.S. citizens
like Haupt, who enter the country surreptitiously during time of war seeking to
destroy U.S. property and lives, are enemy belligerents and unlawful combatants,
subject to the law of war and the jurisdiction of the military."'
'Quirin clearly justifies the use of military tribunals to try enemy combatants
who violate the law of war.353 In Quirin, the U.S. Supreme Court relied heavily
upon the formal declaration of war to justify its holding. 4The formal declaration
of war created a "time of war" and called the Commander in Chief to service.355
The Commander in Chief, "with the power to wage war which Congress
declared," must "carry into effect all laws passed by Congress for the conduct of
war.
, 356
In the limited war against terrorism, the AUMF creates the time of war and
calls into service the Commander in Chief. The Commander in Chief must carry
into effect all laws passed by Congress pertaining to the conduct of war,
including the UCMJ, which prescribes for military jurisdiction over enemy
combatants found in violation of the law of war. Enemy Terrorists found in
violation of the law of war can therefore be tried under a system of military
justice, thus denying them the Constitutional protections guaranteed to criminal
defendants.
C. The Civil Courts are Open
The civil court system has been the traditional forum for prosecuting
terrorists. Timothy McVeigh was tried, convicted and executed under the civil
court system. 37 The African Embassy bombers, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, Mohamed
Rashed Doud Al-Owhali and Kalfen Khamis Mohamed, were arrested, tried, and
convicted in a Manhattan federal court for their involvement in the African Embassies
and Sixth Amendment protections by the military tribunals).
349. Id. at 22.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 45.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45.
355. Id. at 25.
356. Id. at 26.
357. See supra Part Ill (describing McVeigh's criminal prosecution).
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bombings. Each man received a life sentence.358 A fifth terrorist, Wadih al Hage, a
U.S. citizen, was also sentenced to life for conspiracies to murder U.S. nationals
and to destroy government property.359
A jury in the federal court of the Central District of California convicted
Ahmed Ressam for the LAX bombing plot.36° In July 2001, he appeared as a
witness for the prosecution at the New York trial of co-conspirator Mokhtar
Haouari.36'
Currently, the unsuccessful "Shoe Bomber," Richard Reid,362 and the alleged
twentieth hijacker of the September l1th terrorist attacks, Zachariaous
363Moussaoui, are being held and tried under the civil court system. However, the
Department of Defense has custody of at least one U.S. citizen, Jose Padilla, who
is being held as an unlawful enemy combatant under the jurisdiction of the
military courts. '64 The Executive can weigh the advantages and disadvantages of
using the civil court system, but he does have the option of trying unlawful
Enemy Terrorist combatants under either the civil court or the military justice
S 365
systems.
VII. CONCLUSION
AUMF initiates a limited war against Enemy Terrorists. 366 Congress can
initiate an undeclared state of war against places, persons or things by passing a
specific statutory authorization for the use of military force.' 67 By authorizing the
use of necessary and appropriate military force against a specific class of Enemy
Terrorists, Congress has conferred the status of "enemy" upon entities found to
be Enemy Terrorists.6
358. John Ashcroft, Press Conference, Oct. 18, 2001, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/
2001/agcrisisremarkslO_ 18.htm (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
359. Id.
360. United States v. Haouari, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15591, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2001).
361. Id.
362. See Shoe Bomb Suspect 'One of Many,' BBC News, Dec. 26, 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
l/hi/uk/1729614.stm (last visited Sept. 13, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that
Reid attempted to "set off a bomb in his shoe during a Paris-Miami flight").
363. Id.
364. See U.S. Department of State, Wolfowitz Says Defense Department Holds Terrorist Plotter, June
10, 2002, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02061006.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2002) (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that Padilla is being held as 'an enemy combatant' and is
"suspected of planning to explode a radioactive device").
365. See Barr, supra note 261 (arguing that the President can use military tribunals to prosecute
terrorists).
366. See supra Part IV.B (describing the historical and legislative limits on initiating war).
367. Id.
368. See supra Part IV.C.3 (defining "Enemy Terrorist" and Congress' war powers).
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However, the President's power as Commander in Chief is restricted.369 The
AUMF places specific limitations on the Commander in Chief's use of military
force.37° Therefore, the President acts constitutionally so long as he acts in
compliance with the AUMF.37'
Congress authorized the use of military force to destroy Enemy Terrorists.
72
Congress has also authorized the use of military tribunals to try and sentence
captured enemies at war."' Therefore, captured Enemy Terrorists, who are
combatants and are found in violation of the law of war, may be prosecuted
under a system of military tribunals. 74
The U.S. Supreme Court supports the use of military tribunals to prosecute
unlawful enemy combatants, even in cases where the combatant is a U.S.
citizen.375 The military tribunals apply the law of war, not civil law, and therefore,
accused individuals in the military justice system are not entitled to the
constitutional rights ordinarily possessed by criminal defendants.1
76
Thus, by passing the AUMF, Congress changed the status of persons
determined to be Enemy Terrorists from criminals to enemies at war. The
President may destroy or incarcerate enemies in the war against terrorism if he
clears two legal hurdles: congressional legislation regulating the war and the
common law of war.
369. See supra Part V.A (discussing limitations on President's power as Commander in Chief.
370. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the AUMF's limits on the use of force).
371. Supra Part V.A.
372. Id.
373. See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. § 802, art. 2 (West 1998 & Supp.
2002) (describing jurisdictional parameters).
374. See supra Part V.B (discussing the legislative and case history regarding penalties for violations of
the law of war for Enemy Terrorists).
375. Id.
376. Id.

